Several pages changed over the past two weeks, and in most cases the change was to withdraw a passage rather than extend it. Hong Kong moved from medium to high risk for device inspection, the exemption for eSIMs bought outside Japan came out, a 2FA app we recommended turned out to have changed owners, and a blocking distribution drawn from 40 samples was recomputed over all 22,105. The site merged 50 pull requests between 27 July and 10 August, and a sizeable share of them went into corrections of this kind. What follows is page by page: what changed, what the evidence was, and a checklist in the middle for anyone who already prepared using the old guidance.
The schedule is set and all sixteen speakers have confirmed. Across Aug 8 and 9 in room TR-510 at National Taiwan University of Science and Technology, the track runs from how censorship works and browser-fingerprint tracking, through the NTNU campus Tor node and data-privacy rights in the national health-insurance database, to the anonymous-payments session co-organized with ETHTaipei on the Aug 8 afternoon. Right now exactly one person is covering on-site operations.
Changeovers on Aug 9 are only five minutes long. Someone needs to raise the time card before a speaker runs over, and someone needs to use those five minutes to get the next speaker on stage with projection and audio tested. Several speakers have asked not to be recorded, so someone has to watch the whole way through and confirm nothing was captured. That one is unrecoverable if it goes wrong. On the Aug 8 morning there are invited civil-society groups and independent journalists arriving, so someone needs to greet people at the door and help them find seats.
We are looking for three on-site crew
Roles: recording (1), front-of-room runner (1), door runner (1)
Requirements: no background in Tor, anonymity networks, or any privacy technology
Availability: both days is ideal, one day is welcome too, and we will rotate shifts if enough people sign up
To sign up or ask: reach us through any channel on contact and tell us which role you want and which days you can make
This post is based on a guest post on the Tor Blog by Unredacted, with an anoni.net community perspective added for Taiwan and the wider Sinophone region.
Unredacted is a US-based 501(c)(3) non-profit that runs a network of 300+ servers to keep people in heavily censored places connected to the open internet. Their guest post is part of the Tor Blog's spotlight series on organizations defending the free internet, and it opens with a line from a user in China: "You have helped many many people to overcome the great firewall." That kind of message is rare, because people living under censorship usually have no safe channel to send one.
This post highlights what Unredacted builds, and what it looks like from where the anoni.net community sits, in Taiwan.
For people in Iran, the outside internet barely existed for nearly three months. When connectivity started to come back a few days ago, the Tor WebTunnel bridge our community runs began taking on a wave of traffic. That was Iranians who had found a way around the censorship and reconnected to Tor, getting back onto the wider internet.
Wherever you are, you can help
If you have a VPS (a small cloud server) or a physical machine, plus a domain name, you can run a Tor WebTunnel bridge and give people cut off by censorship a way back onto the open internet. Can't run a server? Open a browser tab and run Snowflake instead, it contributes anonymous traffic just the same.
cryptpad.anoni.net Drive home after switching to 中文(正體). Every file category and app entry is localised.
For people who want a collaboration tool that does not silently keep a readable copy of their work on the server, the practical options are short. Google Docs, Notion, Microsoft 365 are excellent products, but every paragraph and every revision sits on those vendors’ servers in a form they can read. From there, algorithms, ads, training corpora, and government data requests each have their own path in.
That difference is exactly what matters when a journalist drafts a story that cannot leak, when a campaigner negotiates a strategy that cannot be wiretapped, when an NGO records distress reports from vulnerable users, or when a researcher works on a politically sensitive topic. Whether a first draft can be safely written at all often turns on that one architectural choice.
CryptPad is one of the few collaboration suites where the server genuinely cannot read what you wrote. Content is encrypted in your browser, the server only ever sees ciphertext, and yet a single interface covers most of what people normally reach for in Google Docs, Sheets, Slides, kanban boards, whiteboards, forms, and calendars.
Until recently the suite had one obvious gap for one large group of users: the UI shipped in English and Simplified Chinese only, with Traditional Chinese (zh_Hant) missing. From the first upstream PR opened at the end of 2023, through two and a half years of patient string-by-string work in Weblate, to the CryptPad 2026.5.0 “🌷 Spring release” on 2026/05/13, zh_Hant is now a built-in locale. The community-hosted cryptpad.anoni.net has been upgraded. Open cryptpad.anoni.net today and the Drive, the document editors, and the share-permission dialog are all in Traditional Chinese. Readers in Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macau, and across the Chinese-reading diaspora can use it without first learning an English menu.
A publicly listed Taipei-traded company shipped 1,708 CSA-7400 high-density network platforms to a Chinese customer between 2019 and 2020. Those appliances ended up in Kazakhstan running a national-grade internet censorship and surveillance system. The supplier was ADLINK Technologies (TWSE: 6166), the customer was Geedge Networks, and the system they ran was the flagship Tiangou Secure Gateway (TSG), an offering whose capabilities rival China's Great Firewall.
That is the central finding of MADLink: A Taiwanese Vestige in the Geedge Supply Chain, InterSecLab's April 2026 report and the first follow-up to their September 2025 The Internet Coup. The anoni.net community has completed the Mandarin (Taiwan terminology, zh-TW) translation. Unlike the previous Internet Coup release, this round also ships an editorial observation page mapping how Taiwan's media, government, and legislators have received the report — with an English summary written for international readers.
In November 2025, the first campus Tor Relay in Taiwan went live at National Taiwan Normal University's CSIE department. Over the past six months, community member NZ (Su En-Li) — the student who pushed the proposal through — worked with the community to turn that experience into a reusable template kit. The three documents are now published under CC-BY 4.0, with a long-form interview as the entry point.
The templates are ready. The next step is for more universities to take them up.
The community-hosted onionoo-fastapi service is now public at https://onionoo.anoni.net, released as v1.0.0. It wraps the Tor Project's official Onionoo API in two interfaces: a semantic HTTP API with a full OpenAPI document, and a Model Context Protocol (MCP) server.
Connect it to Claude Desktop, Cursor, Claude Code, or any MCP-capable client and you can ask a single question like "how many running Tor relays does Taiwan have right now, what is the total bandwidth, and what are the top five ASNs?" The agent breaks the question down, picks tools, fetches the data, and returns a readable summary. You do not need to learn Onionoo's field schema before starting research.
On 2 April 2026, Taiwan’s Executive Yuan (the cabinet) approved the Financial Supervisory Commission’s draft Virtual Asset Service Act and sent it to the Legislative Yuan for review. If you follow crypto policy or stablecoins, this matters because Taiwan is moving from an anti–money laundering registration regime toward a licensing regime for service providers. This post is a status briefing that gathers the April 2026 cabinet move in one place for readers who mostly skip the Mandarin policy wires. It stays at the policy level. For legal questions, talk to a qualified professional in Taiwan.
This year we are excited to partner with ETHTaipei (Taipei Ethereum Community) on program coordination. Both communities approach anonymous payments from different angles. To ensure each submission reaches the most fitting audience, we will review proposals together:
Application-oriented and introductory talks: prioritized for the Anonymity Networks Community track
Technical and protocol-level talks: may be moved to the ETHTaipei blockchain track
You do not need to decide which track to submit to — we will discuss placement with speakers during the review process. Both communities will cross-promote their schedules, so attendees can move between tracks to follow related topics across the event.
On Day 2 (Aug 9), both communities plan to co-organize a dedicated session on Anonymous Payments. Speakers and attendees interested in this topic are especially encouraged to take note. If you have a relevant proposal, feel free to mention in your submission notes that you are interested in being included in the cross-community session.
This track is for lawful use and does not support money laundering, tax evasion, or other illegal activity.
For topics involving anonymity tools, crypto assets, or coin mixing, focus on education and risk understanding, and remind audiences about legal differences across jurisdictions.
Public teaching materials and demo assets should follow COSCUP requirements and use open licenses.
COSCUP is Taiwan's annual open-source community conference, centered on open-source collaboration and free admission. This track aims to connect technology communities and civic groups, expand practical exchange and local collaboration around anonymity, privacy, and internet freedom, and make participation easier for people who prefer a lower-profile presence with less personal data exposure.
