Projects

Tor relays in Thailand

Tor relays are volunteer servers that carry encrypted traffic for Tor users around the world. The more running relays and bandwidth a region has, the more it contributes to the network. Spread matters too: when every relay sits on one provider, trouble at that provider, or pressure on it, takes them all down together.

The data comes from Pulse, which the community runs. It collects from Onionoo, part of Tor Metrics, every hour, and the page is regenerated every hour as well. Taiwan is shown by default, with other regions as reference points; switch between them with the region list below. The glossary at the end of the page explains the fields and flags. Each quarter's changes are written up in the quarterly reports.

Latest snapshot 2026-10-10 11:00 UTC

Running relays 3
Bandwidth 4.9MB/s
Networks (ASNs) 2
Exit relays 0

Cards show the latest snapshot against 30 days ago, with the trend over the last 60 days. An autonomous system (ASN) is a network run by one organisation, such as a telecom, a university or a cloud provider, and the more ASNs relays spread across the better. Exit relays connect users to ordinary websites, which see the exit relay's IP address.

Running relays and bandwidth

Running and stopped relays in the last snapshot of each day, and the total observed bandwidth of the running ones. A stopped relay appeared in the past week but is missing from the latest Tor network consensus, perhaps because it was shut down, lost its connection or is no longer maintained. Observed bandwidth is the most traffic a relay reports it can sustain, an upper bound on what it can carry.

RelaysRunningStopped
02.5510/102026/10/10 Running 32026/10/10 Stopped 0
Observed bandwidth (MB/s)
02.5510/102026/10/10 Bandwidth 4.9

Use and contribution

Tor Metrics estimates the average number of Tor clients online at the same time each day from the directory requests relays receive; it cannot count distinct people. Bridges are entry points that are not publicly listed in the Tor directory, used when connecting directly is blocked, so a high bridge share usually means direct connections to Tor are being blocked. Weight is the score Tor gives each relay from bandwidth measurements, and clients pick relays by weight, so a region's total weight roughly matches the share of Tor traffic passing through it. Setting the region's share of the world's users beside its weight shows the gap between the capacity it uses and the capacity it provides.

Concurrent users 20,699 30-day average
Via bridges 16.2% 30-day average
Share of world users 0.61% 30-day average
Share of network weight <0.001% Latest snapshot
Average concurrent Tor clients connecting directly, per day
025k50k08/1109/0910/072026/08/11 Direct 23,2672026/08/12 Direct 21,2472026/08/13 Direct 24,8432026/08/14 Direct 20,9502026/08/15 Direct 16,7312026/08/16 Direct 19,7622026/08/17 Direct 26,7602026/08/18 Direct 25,6512026/08/19 Direct 25,0432026/08/20 Direct 23,8222026/08/21 Direct 20,6902026/08/22 Direct 16,7642026/08/23 Direct 19,5952026/08/24 Direct 28,2752026/08/25 Direct 27,9402026/08/26 Direct 25,5382026/08/27 Direct 23,1942026/08/28 Direct 20,2542026/08/29 Direct 16,7622026/08/30 Direct 20,7972026/08/31 Direct 28,4422026/09/01 Direct 29,6412026/09/02 Direct 31,0582026/09/03 Direct 23,9362026/09/04 Direct 20,5242026/09/05 Direct 16,2972026/09/06 Direct 18,3172026/09/07 Direct 22,7642026/09/08 Direct 23,8102026/09/09 Direct 21,2222026/09/10 Direct 20,3742026/09/11 Direct 19,3172026/09/12 Direct 16,7782026/09/13 Direct 16,5602026/09/14 Direct 18,8932026/09/15 Direct 18,5452026/09/16 Direct 17,6072026/09/17 Direct 18,3802026/09/18 Direct 17,0832026/09/19 Direct 19,4642026/09/20 Direct 17,8642026/09/21 Direct 18,3522026/09/22 Direct 18,6742026/09/23 Direct 17,3062026/09/24 Direct 17,4012026/09/25 Direct 15,4872026/09/26 Direct 14,3682026/09/27 Direct 14,7172026/09/28 Direct 14,8952026/09/29 Direct 14,4372026/09/30 Direct 15,7982026/10/01 Direct 16,4422026/10/02 Direct 14,8802026/10/03 Direct 15,0942026/10/04 Direct 15,6892026/10/05 Direct 17,2172026/10/06 Direct 16,6792026/10/07 Direct 16,808
Share via bridges (%)
012.52508/1109/0910/072026/08/11 Via bridges 18.92026/08/12 Via bridges 13.92026/08/13 Via bridges 18.92026/08/14 Via bridges 15.92026/08/15 Via bridges 10.72026/08/16 Via bridges 11.62026/08/17 Via bridges 15.02026/08/18 Via bridges 15.82026/08/19 Via bridges 16.82026/08/20 Via bridges 16.62026/08/21 Via bridges 14.72026/08/22 Via bridges 9.92026/08/23 Via bridges 11.22026/08/24 Via bridges 14.42026/08/25 Via bridges 14.72026/08/26 Via bridges 16.12026/08/27 Via bridges 18.12026/08/28 Via bridges 14.42026/08/29 Via bridges 9.52026/08/30 Via bridges 11.22026/08/31 Via bridges 16.52026/09/01 Via bridges 15.12026/09/02 Via bridges 12.72026/09/03 Via bridges 15.02026/09/04 Via bridges 12.52026/09/05 Via bridges 8.82026/09/06 Via bridges 10.32026/09/07 Via bridges 15.42026/09/08 Via bridges 14.62026/09/09 Via bridges 17.82026/09/10 Via bridges 16.52026/09/11 Via bridges 15.62026/09/12 Via bridges 10.42026/09/13 Via bridges 17.32026/09/14 Via bridges 19.82026/09/15 Via bridges 19.32026/09/16 Via bridges 18.92026/09/17 Via bridges 19.22026/09/18 Via bridges 15.22026/09/19 Via bridges 7.32026/09/20 Via bridges 9.52026/09/21 Via bridges 16.12026/09/22 Via bridges 17.72026/09/23 Via bridges 18.82026/09/24 Via bridges 16.82026/09/25 Via bridges 15.82026/09/26 Via bridges 10.02026/09/27 Via bridges 10.72026/09/28 Via bridges 15.52026/09/29 Via bridges 19.92026/09/30 Via bridges 19.82026/10/01 Via bridges 19.22026/10/02 Via bridges 20.62026/10/03 Via bridges 10.22026/10/04 Via bridges 11.22026/10/05 Via bridges 18.12026/10/06 Via bridges 17.92026/10/07 Via bridges 22.0

Tor Metrics estimates up to 2026-10-07

Diversity

The more autonomous systems (ASNs) the relays spread across, the less likely trouble at a single provider is to take them all down at once.

Relays by ASN
ASNNameRelays
AS17552 TRUE INTERNET CORPORATION CO. LTD. 2
AS45758 ADVANCED WIRELESS NETWORK COMPANY LIMITED 1
Number of ASNs
01210/102026/10/10 Number of ASNs 2

Relay roles

Guards are the first hop of a circuit, exits connect to the destination, and middles sit in between. A relay can hold more than one role.

Relay rolesGuardMiddleExit
02.5510/102026/10/10 Guard 02026/10/10 Middle 32026/10/10 Exit 0

Tor versions

Tor versions on running relays, with each day's bar adding up to 100%. The faster a new version's share grows after a release, the faster operators are keeping up.

Tor versions0.4.9.140.4.9.130.4.9.11
05010010/102026/10/10 0.4.9.14 1(33%)2026/10/10 0.4.9.13 1(33%)2026/10/10 0.4.9.11 1(33%)
Versions in the latest snapshot
  • 0.4.9.141
  • 0.4.9.131
  • 0.4.9.111
Flags
  • V2Dir3Serves directory data for Tor clients to download
  • Fast2At least 100 KB/s, or in the top seven-eighths of the network
  • Stable2Up long enough to suit long-lived connections

Flags the directory authorities, the few servers that vote on the Tor network consensus every hour, assign from each relay's behaviour. What each flag means is written under its name. A relay can carry several, and Running and Valid, which every running relay has, are left out.

Across regions

Running relays in the latest snapshot, with the trend over the last 60 days. Open a region for its full charts.

Use and contribution across regions

Relay counts are above. Weight comes from the latest snapshot; users and the bridge share are Tor Metrics averages over the last 30 days. Weight has been collected since October 2026. The reference region at the end has no running relays, so only users and the bridge share are listed.

RegionWeightUsersBridges
Taiwan 0.008% 8,592 5.9%
Japan 0.034% 36,785 3.1%
South Korea 0.008% 28,592 2.1%
Hong Kong 0.029% 7,886 6.7%
Macau <0.001% 251 4.0%
Singapore 0.041% 31,782 1.6%
Vietnam 0.008% 18,582 1.5%
Thailand <0.001% 20,699 16.2%
Malaysia 0.019% 12,208 5.9%
Indonesia 0.015% 46,585 1.3%
Philippines 0.011% 20,946 1.2%
India 0.050% 125,922 1.8%
Germany 29.7% 309,333 1.9%
Netherlands 17.3% 124,076 3.5%
United States 14.4% 621,209 4.1%
Reference regions
China – 4,995 49.8%

Glossary

  • Tor relay: a server that carries encrypted traffic for Tor users. A Tor connection passes through three relays in turn, an entry (guard), a middle and an exit, and each relay only knows the one before and the one after it
  • Snapshot: Pulse reads the state of every relay from Onionoo once an hour, and each reading is a snapshot. Times on the page are UTC
  • Running, stopped: a running relay is listed in the latest Tor network consensus. A stopped relay appeared in the past week but is missing from that consensus
  • Observed bandwidth: the most traffic a relay reports it could sustain over the past few days, an upper bound on what it can carry. Actual traffic is usually lower. MB/s is megabytes per second; multiply by 8 for roughly Mbps
  • Autonomous system (ASN): a group of networks run by one organisation under one routing policy, such as a telecom, a university or a cloud provider, each with its own AS number
  • Exit relay: the last relay on a connection, which reaches ordinary websites on the user's behalf. Websites see the exit relay's IP address, so exit operators handle more abuse complaints
  • Roles and flags: the roles chart follows Onionoo's probabilities, counting any relay with a probability above zero. Flags come from the directory authorities under stricter conditions, so a region's number of guards by role and by flag can differ
  • Directory authorities: a handful of servers run by people the Tor Project trusts, which vote every hour on the network consensus listing every relay and its flags
  • Tor version: for example 0.4.9.13. Versions sharing the first three parts belong to one series, and the last part is an update within it, usually with security fixes
  • Concurrent users: Tor Metrics' estimate of the average number of Tor clients connected at the same time during a day. One person may use several devices, or use Tor for only a few minutes a day, so this is not a count of people
  • Bridge: an entry relay that is not publicly listed in the Tor directory. Where connecting to Tor directly is blocked, users connect through bridges
  • Share of world users: the region's users, direct and through bridges, as a share of all Tor users
  • Share of network weight: Tor gives each relay a weight from bandwidth measurements (consensus weight), and clients pick relays by weight. The total weight of a region's relays roughly matches the share of Tor traffic passing through it
  • Reference region: a region without its own page, listed in a comparison table for contrast

How the numbers are calculated

  • Each day uses its last snapshot, not every relay seen during the day
  • Bandwidth is the sum of the observed bandwidth of running relays
  • Share of network weight is the sum of the running relays' consensus weight fractions, collected since October 2026
  • User estimates come from Tor Metrics, updated daily with a lag of two to three days; How many people use Tor in Taiwan explains the method and its limits
  • Relay roles follow Onionoo's probabilities: a relay counts as a guard, middle or exit when that probability is above zero
  • Days when collection was interrupted show as gaps in the charts, with nothing filled in
  • The raw data is available from the Pulse API; this page uses /api/summary

Running your own