The lawsuit to revoke Thailand's notification on urgent takedowns of online content

Thai Lawyers for Human Rights (TLHR) and iLaw filed a suit at the Central Administrative Court on 14 October, asking it to revoke parts of a notification issued by the Ministry of Digital Economy and Society (MDES). The notification was signed on 19 June, published in the Royal Gazette on 17 July and took effect the next day. It defines "urgent necessity" under Section 20 of the Computer Crime Act as a situation in which delay could threaten national security, religion, the monarchy, good morals, social culture or public order, and provides that in such cases an official designated within the ministry petitions a court, with evidence, to suspend the dissemination of the data or remove it. According to TLHR's summary, paragraph 5 of Section 20 lets officials petition a court in urgent cases before the minister or the Computer Data Screening Committee has approved.

Under the definition sit four types of data. The fourth is a list of 14 categories contrary to public order or good morals, covering any data that falls into them and has been approved by the Computer Data Screening Committee. The categories include gambling, sales of illegal firearms, e-cigarettes, cannabis, alcohol, lending above the legal interest rate, surrogacy advertising, and images or text that mock, ridicule, belittle or refer to Buddhism in a way that damages it or exposes it to abuse or hatred.

The lawsuit targets only two of these categories, along with the definition of "urgent necessity" itself. One covers content that defames, ridicules, refers to or belittles the King, the Queen, the Heir-Apparent, the Regent, members of the royal family or the monarchy. The other covers images or text that demean others and incite hatred, create a sense of division or negative stereotypes, and could lead to social division, conflict and wider violence.

According to a Daily News report of 21 July, the ministry's permanent secretary said the notification removed time constraints in the previous screening process. Illegal URLs had grown from tens of thousands to millions, and handling time could fall from several days to a few hours. The scope covers all kinds of online threats, such as mule accounts, deepfake investment scams, e-cigarette advertising and SMS scams. Ministry figures show 883,012 URLs blocked from October 2025 to 13 July 2026, before the notification took effect.

In July, the law firm Tilleke & Gibbins advised platforms, e-commerce businesses and fintech companies to expect a significant increase in government-initiated takedown orders.

Perspective

The notification governs online data disseminated in Thailand, so those directly affected are people who publish or access content in Thailand, and the platforms and internet service providers that must comply with court orders. We found no explanation of how it treats posts made outside Thailand. The points in dispute were raised by the plaintiffs, and as of 29 October the ministry had not responded publicly to any of them or to the lawsuit itself.

The first point is the minister's authority. The notification was issued, according to its text, under Section 4 of the Computer Crime Act, and the reason given in its preamble is a large increase in illegal or inappropriate data that calls for a stronger mechanism to stop its dissemination. TLHR argues that Section 4 only authorises the minister to set procedures and mechanisms for carrying out the act, and gives no power to define "urgent necessity" under paragraph 5 of Section 20.

The second point is scope and wording. The clause on the monarchy includes a reason for listing it, namely that these figures are revered by the people according to the beliefs and traditions of Thai society. TLHR argues that the categories go beyond what Section 20 sets out, and that "refer to", which the Royal Institute dictionary defines as "to be connected with", could also capture neutral mentions. TLHR also notes that "the monarchy" is not defined in law, while the ministry's July explanations discussed only scams, gambling, e-cigarette advertising and URL counts.

In an analysis from July, iLaw notes that Section 112 of the Criminal Code, the lèse-majesté provision, protects the King, the Queen, the Heir-Apparent and the Regent. The notification extends the list to members of the royal family and adds "refer to" to the covered acts. iLaw also argues that the category on hatred leaves officials and the screening committee room for discretion that could take in good-faith criticism, while noting that most categories are acts already prohibited under other laws.

The third point is procedure. Clauses 3 and 4 of the notification set out how a petition is filed: an official submits evidence to a court, and must strictly follow the relevant laws and regulations. TLHR and iLaw further argue that the ministry did not hold the consultation required by law before issuing it, and iLaw found no consultation on the ministry's website or on the government's central law portal.

A second suit reached the same court on the same day. According to MGR Online, another foundation also asked for the notification to be revoked, arguing that it could make people censor themselves out of fear. As of 29 October, TLHR, iLaw and the press had reported only the filing, and we found nothing on whether the court has accepted either case or issued any stay.

Beyond the lawsuit, the permanent secretary's explanation and the text of the notification differ on one point. In the explanation, the fast-track process involves working with foreign social media platforms and Thai internet service providers to stop content directly, without waiting for a court order, when it is clearly illegal. The notification contains no such provision. The Nation, an English-language Thai newspaper, also reports that the ministry's existing procedure under Section 14 of the Computer Crime Act lets officials, with the approval of the permanent secretary or a designated deputy, order providers to suspend or remove certain illegal computer data.

We are a community based in Taiwan, where "good morals" appears in Article 72 of the Civil Code, which concerns whether a juridical act is valid and is not a standard for taking down online content.

As far as we found in Taiwan's statutes, the closest mechanism for harmful content is in the Protection of Children and Youths Welfare and Rights Act, last amended in January 2021 according to the Laws and Regulations Database. Article 43 lists the categories, and under Article 46 complaints go to iWIN (Institute of Watch Internet Network). When the competent authority notifies a platform that content is harmful to children's physical or mental health, the platform must restrict children's access to it or remove it first. That mechanism does not go through a court, and it protects only children and young people.

In mainland China, Article 4 of the Provisions on the Governance of the Online Information Content Ecosystem, issued by the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) and in force since 1 March 2020, requires producers of online information content to obey laws and regulations and to "follow public order and good customs" (遵循公序良俗). The specific categories come in two tiers, in Articles 6 and 7.

Article 6 lists 11 kinds of illegal information that producers may not create, copy or publish, including content spreading obscenity, pornography, gambling or violence, inciting ethnic hatred or discrimination, undermining the state's religious policy, or harming national honour and interests. Article 7 adds nine kinds of negative information that producers must "take measures to prevent and resist", such as sexually suggestive content and content inciting discrimination against groups or regions. The last of the nine is "other content that has an adverse effect on the online ecosystem", with no specific conduct named.

Under Article 10, platforms may not disseminate the information in Article 6 and must prevent and resist disseminating the information in Article 7. On finding either, they must immediately take measures in accordance with the law, keep records and report to the competent authorities. We searched the full text of the Provisions and found no occurrence of "court" (法院); the duty to act falls directly on platforms, whereas the Thai notification requires officials to petition a court.

Readers can compare approaches across jurisdictions with a few questions. First, whether the categories of content that may be restricted are written into statute or filled in by an administrative notification or regulation. Second, whether suspending dissemination requires a court first, and whether cooperation with platforms outside the courts follows published rules. Third, whether an urgent procedure can deal within hours with clearly illegal content such as scams, and whether categories concerning speech should be handled separately from it.