Monitoring figures on social media takedowns in Indonesia and the communications ministry's response
On 12 November, the Indonesian groups SAFEnet and Remotivi released monitoring results recording 127 pieces of social media content restricted or removed as of 8 November, up from 73 in their previous release on 8 September. The two groups attribute 94 of them to requests from the Ministry of Communication and Digital Affairs. On 13 November a ministry official said it was willing to open its records for comparison, and that it is preparing a public notice mechanism to be used before access is cut off, with no date announced as of 14 November. Readers outside Indonesia are not directly affected.
On 12 November, the Indonesian digital rights group SAFEnet and the media monitoring group Remotivi released a statement recording 127 pieces of social media content restricted or removed as of 8 November, up from 73 in their previous release on 8 September. The two groups attribute 94 of the 127 to requests from the Ministry of Communication and Digital Affairs (Komdigi), and on 13 November a Komdigi official said the ministry was willing to open its records for comparison with the groups' data. In late October, SAFEnet and other groups also opened a desk to assess legal action against Komdigi. The restrictions apply inside Indonesia, and readers elsewhere are not directly affected.
According to the statement, the 94 items make up 74.0% of the 127, compared with 66 of 73 (about 90%) in the previous release. The share handled by platforms on their own under community guidelines rose from 9.6% to 26.0% (33 items), and the statement adds that Komdigi's requests have not decreased. Platforms also do not always disclose that a request came from Komdigi.
X handled the most items, 56 (44.1%), followed by Threads with 43 (33.9%). The most common action on Threads was geolocking (hiding a post from Indonesian IP addresses), used on 25 of its 43 items. Criticism of the president and criticism of officials and the government were the most common topics, with 32 items each. Thirteen items concerned forest and land fires, some of them reported in mid-October while haze covered Kalimantan.
Among the fire cases in the statement, two posts on X criticising the president for being slow to put out the fires received notices citing a Komdigi request over allegedly unlawful content, as did a post mourning the Way Kambas fire and the animals there. An Instagram post about the fires with a photo of the president on its cover, and a Threads post criticising the president's handling of the fires, were taken down at the same Komdigi request. Platforms also removed content under their own community guidelines: one group reported that TikTok deleted its investigative video on carbon monoxide and the air pollution index in Central Kalimantan 16 hours after it went up. TikTok also removed a video of the Siak regent planting trees on a former fire site for violating community guidelines, and the statement describes the video as showing post-fire recovery work.
The statement lists two practices as new since the 8 September release. A Threads user posting about forest fires repeatedly received notices that their posts were limited to users aged 18 and over, and Meta rejected ads about the Kalimantan fires without a clear reason. The two groups speculate that the age restriction may rest on the government regulation PP Tunas rather than the Electronic Information and Transactions Law.
According to SAFEnet, people were threatened, intimidated and doxxed (had personal details published without consent) online in October and November. Cases rose markedly from early November, mainly on Threads, often when users were calling on the government to take responsibility for the forest fires in Kalimantan and Sumatra. The methods listed include messages or calls from unknown numbers whose senders knew the poster's real name and workplace and demanded the post be deleted by a deadline. Other methods include spreading names, phone numbers or ID documents, mass messaging and threats against family members, and the statement gives neither the number of cases nor who the senders were.
According to Kompas, the secretary of Komdigi's Directorate General of Digital Space Supervision said at the ministry on 13 November that monitoring by civil society groups is part of public oversight. If the two groups want to compare data based on the complaints they received, the ministry is ready to open its records. The secretary also said the ministry and platforms deal with each other through an electronic system whose records cannot be altered and can be audited after the fact. According to CNN Indonesia, the secretary added that moderation errors cannot be ruled out, and that the ministry is prepared to review and correct any mistakes it confirms.
Perspective
Geolocking decides whether to show a post based on the IP address of the connection, so the post is not deleted and may still be visible from networks outside Indonesia (our inference). Age restrictions affect who can see a post, and ad rejection affects whether an ad can run at all. OONI (Open Observatory of Network Interference, censorship measurements run by volunteers in many countries) measures whether websites can be reached, and action on individual posts falls outside what it measures. Outside counts rely mainly on reports from the people affected, and the ministry's and platforms' records had not been made public as of 14 November (our assessment).
According to SAFEnet's statement, the data depends on people voluntarily filling in a complaint form, and people worried about their safety or the consequences may not report, so the count is only the tip of the iceberg. According to CNN Indonesia, the secretary said the 74% figure comes from the 127 cases the two groups received and compiled, and that the ministry cannot yet confirm which cases the 94 are. The secretary also said the numbers did not match when the ministry searched by period, and that its own figure could be higher or lower.
On notice and transparency, SAFEnet's executive director told detikInet on 21 October that Komdigi should state the legal basis for every restriction request and make its review process public. The executive director also called for affected users to receive a notice and have an effective way to appeal. According to CNN Indonesia, the government is preparing a public notice mechanism for cutting off access to content, in response to the Constitutional Court's September ruling that notice must come before access is cut off. The report did not mention formal rules or a launch date, and as of 14 November we could not find any announcement either.
According to the two groups' statement, the notices on three fire posts on X said the action was taken at Komdigi's request, and one post each on Instagram and Threads was taken down at the same Komdigi request (the statement does not give the wording of those two notices). The statement also cites the constitution and environmental law, arguing that restricting protest over the fires deprives residents of the right to talk about their own safety. Before the statement came out, Komdigi's director for digital space control told detikInet on 20 October that the ministry had never instructed or asked platforms to restrict or remove content about the forest fires. The director also said that drops in reach (fewer people seeing a post) or deletions should be checked with the platforms.
For people whose content has been restricted by a platform in Indonesia, the minister of communication and digital affairs suggested on 21 October appealing to the platform first and then reporting to the ministry. When the legal team formed by SAFEnet and other groups sought plaintiffs in late October, it asked people to attach screenshots of moderation notices, links to the content, correspondence with the platform and reach data. Keeping these records gives a basis for any later appeal or request for legal help (our suggestion, drawing on the types of evidence the legal team lists).
According to CNN Indonesia's report of 13 November, the two groups invited the ministry to a public examination on 17 November, though SAFEnet's statement itself does not mention the invitation. The examination falls after our check on 14 November, so whether it took place and what came of it need to be checked separately. We found no public statement from Meta, TikTok or X on the groups' release, and no report of the legal team filing a lawsuit (checked on 14 November). Public information alone is not enough to tell whether the cases in the statement match the ministry's records (our assessment).
Article 40(2b) of Indonesia's Electronic Information and Transactions Law lets the government cut off access itself or order platforms to do so, and the article requires no court order. The law's elucidation counts closing accounts and deleting content as cutting off access. In its ruling of 29 September (311/PUU-XXIV/2026), the Constitutional Court required the government to issue a notice with reasons before cutting off access, but did not accept the argument that prior court approval should be required. In Hong Kong, Schedule 4 of the Implementation Rules for Article 43 of the Law of the People's Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (2020) covers messages likely to constitute an offence endangering national security.
Under Part 2 of that schedule, a designated officer authorised by the Commissioner of Police, with the approval of the Secretary for Security, can require a publisher or a platform to remove or disable such a message, with no court procedure. The publisher may receive a removal requirement in writing, but Schedule 4 contains no provision on giving reasons or a route of appeal, nor on telling the publisher when the requirement goes to the platform instead. In mainland China, the Provisions on the Governance of the Online Information Content Ecosystem, in force since March 2020, require platforms that find the illegal or undesirable information listed in Articles 6 and 7 to act on it immediately, keep records and report to the authorities; this duty sits with the platform itself rather than arising from a government order. The provisions never mention a court, and Article 16 requires a channel for public complaints and reports, but no article covers notifying the publisher or letting them object.
When comparing the accounts, one thing to watch is whether the ministry's records match the civil society reports, and whether platforms tell posters that a request came from the government. The ministry noted on 20 October that each platform has its own community guidelines. Another indicator is how two shares change over time: items handled by platforms under their own guidelines (26.0% this time) and items requested by the ministry. Whether people have a way to appeal after receiving a notice, and whether the errors the ministry says it will correct lead to public corrections or statistics, are worth following as well.