The Bureau of Consular Affairs website breach and 72,702 leaked passport photo files
Taiwan's Bureau of Consular Affairs, part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, found on 4 November that some of its websites had been broken into. Some passport photos uploaded between 3 September and 2 November through online appointments, travel agency bulk applications and conditional online passport renewal were leaked, 72,702 files in all. Applications made over the counter or through the one-stop service at household registration offices are not included. According to the bureau's announcement and Q&A, passports remain valid, and people confirmed to be within the scope can get a free replacement until 14 May 2027 (checked on 15 November). Some letters of authorisation verified by Taiwan's representative office in New York and some ABTC application data were also leaked, and ABTC applicants can ask to change their photo until 31 December.
Taiwan's Bureau of Consular Affairs (BOCA), part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, announced on 9 November that some of its websites had been broken into, and in an update on 12 November confirmed that three kinds of data had been taken without authorisation. The largest set is passport photos: some of the photos people uploaded between 3 September and 2 November through individual online appointments, bulk applications filed by travel agencies and the conditional online passport renewal service, 72,702 files in all. Applications made over the counter or through the one-stop service at household registration offices are not included, and the official Q&A notes that not everyone who applied through those three channels in that period is affected. According to the bureau, passports already issued remain valid, and people confirmed to be within the scope can apply for a free replacement until 14 May 2027.
According to BOCA's announcement, it began finding signs on the afternoon of 4 November that some of its websites had been intruded upon, and it immediately isolated the servers involved, preserved evidence and reported the incident to the cybersecurity authority. The websites came back online after the code was repaired and security tested. Citing a digital forensics report, the official Q&A says no leak of other personal data, such as names, dates of birth, national ID numbers or passport numbers, has been found. As of 15 November, official documents did not state the cause of the intrusion or name the contractor involved.
The second set is scanned letters of authorisation verified by Taiwan's representative office in New York between 26 October 2011 and 6 November 2026, 26,072 files in all. According to the Q&A on these letters, they were verified for overseas Taiwanese living in New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania and Connecticut who authorised relatives or friends in Taiwan to handle matters on their behalf. Cases handled in Taiwan or at other overseas missions are not included. Original letters still within their authorisation period remain valid and do not need to be redone.
The third set is application data for the APEC Business Travel Card (ABTC), a business travel card that applicants obtain through BOCA. According to the ABTC Q&A, the application data includes the application category (such as manufacturing, wholesale or finance), job title and nominating agency. The announcement says what was taken is part of the data submitted through the online application form between 1 September and 10 November, covering 774 applications. Besides those three fields, the leaked data includes the applicant's photo, application number, sex and place of birth, but not names, passport numbers or contact details.
The announcement also says that if the contractor is found to have failed to meet the security obligations in its contract, the bureau will pursue its liability and seek compensation under the law. BOCA will also compile evidence and refer the intrusion to the judicial authorities for investigation.
Perspective
According to the official Q&A updated on 13 November, a passport photo can identify a person, so it is personal data protected under Taiwan's Personal Data Protection Act (PDPA). No specific misuse has been confirmed as resulting from the incident. Anyone who finds their photo being misused or used in a scam should keep the evidence and report it to the police. In the Q&A's words, as long as a person's facial features have not changed, there should be no need to apply for a new passport because of the incident.
Under Taiwan's Cyber Security Management Act as amended in September 2025, a government agency that becomes aware of a cybersecurity incident must report it to the competent authority and to its superior or supervising agency, and then submit a report on its investigation, handling and improvements. The same Act requires government agencies that outsource the operation of information systems to supervise the contractor's security management and to set out liability for breach of contract in a written agreement.
Under the current PDPA, an agency that violates the Act, resulting in personal data being stolen or leaked, must notify the people concerned by appropriate means after the facts are established, and official documents take no position on whether BOCA violated the Act. Amendments promulgated in November 2025 but not yet in force would instead require notification as soon as an agency becomes aware that personal data has leaked, and as of 15 November the Laws & Regulations Database still listed their effective date as undetermined. The Q&A on the letters of authorisation says the bureau has reported the incident to the PDPA's competent authority as required by law. As of 15 November, the only public channels were the announcement and a hotline for checking whether a photo was leaked (details below), and official documents did not say whether people whose photos fall within the scope would be notified individually.
Rules elsewhere in Asia offer a comparison, though none of them apply to this Taiwanese incident: as of 9 October 2026, data users in Hong Kong had no statutory duty to report a personal data breach to the Office of the Privacy Commissioner for Personal Data (PCPD), whose June 2023 guidance recommends notifying the office and the affected people as soon as practicable. Making breach notification mandatory was among the amendment proposals the government listed in January 2025, and government papers to the Legislative Council in July 2026 still described amending the privacy ordinance as under study. In Singapore, the Personal Data Protection Commission (PDPC) states on its page about the Personal Data Protection Act 2012 that the Act generally does not apply to public agencies in relation to collecting, using or disclosing personal data (as of 15 November), so its breach notification duties, such as notifying the PDPC within three calendar days of assessing a breach as notifiable (as of 9 October 2026), generally would not cover a breach at a ministry itself (our inference). Under the same Act, a data intermediary processing personal data on behalf of a public agency must notify that agency of a breach without undue delay (as of 9 October 2026).
In mainland China, Article 57 of the Personal Information Protection Law requires any personal information handler, public or private, to take remedial measures immediately when a leak occurs or may occur, and to notify the authorities responsible for personal information protection and the affected individuals, without setting a number of days. Separately, the national cybersecurity incident reporting measures issued by the Cyberspace Administration of China, in force since 1 November 2025, require departments of central and state organs and their directly affiliated units to report to their own department's cyber affairs office within two hours, against four hours to the provincial cyberspace office for most other network operators. That deadline applies only to incidents graded "relatively major" or above, and the grading guide attached to the measures usually puts a leak of personal information on one million people or more in that grade (a general clause on large volumes sets no figure). The measures cover cybersecurity incidents rather than personal information leaks as such (as of 9 October 2026).
People who applied through online appointments, travel agency bulk applications or conditional online renewal between 3 September and 2 November can check whether their photo was leaked by calling a hotline set up by a contractor BOCA commissioned, (02) 8979-3100, from 09:00 to 12:00 and 13:30 to 18:00 on weekdays. Other questions about the incident and replacements can go to the bureau's passport issuance division at (02) 2343-2807 or (02) 2343-2808, or by email to [email protected]. Grantors and grantees of letters of authorisation with questions can call the document authentication enquiry line at +886-2-2343-2913 or contact the New York office at +1-212-486-0088.
The free replacement is open only to people confirmed to be within the scope of the leak whose passports have been issued and are still valid, and applications are in principle accepted for six months after the measure was announced on 13 November. Applicants go in person to BOCA or one of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' four regional offices with proof of identity, a photo and the old passport, and someone applying on another person's behalf needs a letter of authorisation. The new passport is issued once free of charge with a full validity period, the old one is surrendered, and all new passports are sent by post. Whether to replace is left to each person's own judgement.
The official Q&A reminds applicants that a new passport comes with a new passport number and new issue and expiry dates, so anyone who has already used the old passport for visas, tickets or other travel arrangements should check whether they are affected. A replacement brings a new photo, number and validity period, but the leaked photos still show the holder's face, and replacing the passport cannot retrieve them (our inference).
ABTC applicants worried about their photo can ask to change it before 31 December by sending a new photo to [email protected] or calling (02) 2343-2975. The email subject should give the 12-digit application number and the words "更換照片" ("change photo"). For applications still under review, BOCA replaces the photo in its system. Cardholders can get a free replacement card, which takes 10 working days, and the old card is cancelled and cannot be used in the meantime.
The ABTC Q&A advises not giving personal data or clicking links when unknown calls, emails or messages ask for them, and verifying instead through the channels listed on BOCA's official website or by calling the 165 anti-fraud hotline. According to a Storm Media report of 12 November, BOCA had previously received reports of social engineering emails (messages that impersonate an official body to lure recipients into clicking a link or filling in data) sent in the name of confirmation emails from its "passport photo upload system". The report advised calling the official hotline directly on receiving an email or text message claiming to be from BOCA that asks you to click a link to "confirm your photo" or "fill in missing data". We did not find this warning in the official passport photo Q&A updated on 13 November.
People who did not apply for a passport through those three channels in that period, did not have a letter of authorisation verified at the New York office and did not use the ABTC online form have nothing to do because of this incident (the anti-scam advice still applies). Next to watch are the full forensic findings, the inquiry into the contractor's liability and the criminal referral, and whether BOCA notifies people whose photos fall within the scope individually.